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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STl\TF OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 18996 
GEORGE B. ARCHAMBEAU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with aggravted 
robbery under Utah Code. Ann. Ii> 76-6-302 (19fl2). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of aggravated robbery on September 16, 1982 in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. On January 18, 
1983, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF Tl!E Fl\CTS 
At l :00 p.m. on Fehruary 'i, 1981, a robher enter.,,! 
the south door of the Zion's First National Rank in Murray, 
Utah, near Fashion Place Mall. Dressed in denim blue overull'-
and a light blue windbreaker with a ren ski mask pullen ovr·r 
his face (T. 15), the robber carried a sawed-off shotgun (T. 
16) to the teller window of Julie terry ( T. 10). The rohber 
told the two clerks to lie on the floor and ordered Julie 
terry to give him the money (T. 16). Julie gave the rohber 
approximately $6,000 (T. 24) while activating the bank's 
cameras ( T. 14). After staying in the bank approximately two 
minutes (T. 32), the robber left by the south doors (T. 
24-25). 
Robert Cosaert entered the south doors of the bank 
just after 1:00 p.m. and encountered a man coming through the 
inner doors (T. 78-79). The man was dressed darkly with " ski 
mask that covered all hut a six inch in diameter oblong area 
around his eyes, disclosing the robber's face from the bottom 
of his nose to just above the eyebrows (T. RO). Mr. cosaert 
passed within thirteen or fourteen inches of the robber (T. 
79-80) for a four or five second view of the eyes ( T. 83). Jn 
a man's voice, the robber said "Excuse me" as he passed Mr. 
Cosaert (T. 83). 
Mr. Cosaert had noticed that the robber was 
caucasion, had light-colored eyebrows, and light blue or 
grayish eyes (T. 81-82), with distinct crow's feet about his 
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eyes (T. 83). On April 3, lg81 (T. 130), Mr. Crosaert 
1J!JSi t ively identified a photo of appellant from among six or 
seven photos displayed by Detective Robinson of the Murray 
1'ity Police (T. 87-88). At trial, Mr. Cosaert stood at the 
same thirteen or fourteen inch distance while appellant wore a 
mask and noted the same features of height, weight, eye and 
eyebrow-color, and crow's feet around the eyes (T. 85-87). 
Annette Cornia was working as a teller and went 
downstairs from the main lobby of the bank just before the 
rnbbery. (T. 106-107). As she descended the first two steps 
next to a large window, an individual walked pass the window 
on the sidewalk toward the south door of the bank. (T. 109, 
118). The man had blond and wavy shoulrler length hair and 
stood between 5'5" and 5'10" (T. 110). His head was not 
covered ( T. 109-110) and Ms. Cornia recognized him as someone 
who had tried unsuccessfully to cash a check earlier in the 
week (T. 114, 120). 
Ms. Cornia proceeded down to the basement, returning 
to the bank's lobby after approximately two minutes to 
discover that a robbery had occured (T. 113). She was 
convinced that she had seen the robber "because when I went 
down, there was no one in the bank and I couldn't have been 
down there for any amount of time, and when I came back there 
was no one there either." (T. 111). Ms. Cornia identified 
cippellant as the man she had seen in the bank a week prior to 
the robbery (T. 121). At trial, Mr. Cornia stated that the 
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color of appellant's hair, the waive> in tlw hair, ancl his 
facial profile matchecl that of the man who passecl the wind 0 , 1 
just before the robbery. 
A search by warrant of appellant's resiclence 
procluced a sawed-off rifle, a reel and blue ski mask, panty-
hose, a plane ticket in appellant's name from Salt Lake to fJJS 
Angeles to Honolulu for February of 19Rl (T. letters tc 
and from Honolulu between appellant and girl friencls, four 
bullets, along with a checkbook in appellant's name to Zi0n's 
First National Bank in Murray (T. 150). 
Laureen Fite clatecl appellant cluring February of 192.l 
(T. 38). In February, appellant and Ms. Fite had a 
conversation concerning bank robberies ( T. 40). Appellant 
showed Ms. Fite a picture of a stack of money taken at 
appellant's house (T. 44). On another accasion, appellant 
discussed the possibility of Ms. Fite obtaining overalls from 
her stepfather (T. 43). Ms. Fite remembered appellant saying 
"that we was going to rob this bank by Fashion Place Mall and 
after we robbed it we was going to go into Fashion Place tlall. 
We were going to take off the uniforms and pretend we were 
buying something He said it had been robbecl before, he 
and Paul." T. 43). Appellant described their previous robhe0 
as having been committed by he and Paul in overalls 
nylons and ski masks over their heads (T. 43). The clec-easP•l, 
Paul Watson, (T. 159) was clescribed by three witnesses as 
having dark hair (T. 48, 147, 161) and brown eyes (T. 48). 
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Randy Sargent testified that his half-brother, Paul 
had call him in the early evening of February 5, 1981 
,,nrl daimed thut he had robbed a bank and taken about $5,000 
(T. 159-160). However, Randy Sargent was not sure of which 
bank Paul claimed to have robbed (T. 162). Paul was later in 
Hawaii with appellant (T. 163). 
Bill Guy Mourer worked as appellant's crew boss for 
Rocky Mountain Communications, a cable-TV line installer (T. 
lfiR-lf;'l). Mr. Mourer testified that appellant never left the 
job site on February 5, 1981 (T. 172) and offered appellant's 
time card with a date which had been changed from February 6 
to February 5 (T. 173). Although Mr. Mourer remembered first 
hearing of appellant's arrest on April 1, 1981, (T. 173), he 
could not remember the exact date when he had corrected 
appellant's time card (T. 17R). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT APPELLANT. 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient 
evidence presented to convict him of aggravated robbery 
because (A) appellant's alibi defense raised a reasonable 
riolli•t as to his presence at the robbery, and (B) the two 
identifications are unreliable and insufficient to 
suprmrt a conviction. However, the existence of conflicting 
-"i-
evidence does not necessarily warr;irit Arrcllant's 
criticism of the eye-witness irlentif1cations 0oes to the 
credibility of their testimony rather than its aclrnic;sihi]i1 
viewing the eviclence in the light most favorahle to thn ]Ut 
verdict, the evidence was not so inherently improbable or 
inconclusive that reasonable minds could not have reasonahJc 
believed that appellant committed the robbery. 
The standard of appellate review on insufficient 
evidence states that: 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence [viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict] is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Bradford, Utah, 663 P.2d 68, 69 (1983) (citing State 
v. Petree, Utah, 1559 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)); State v. Linrlen, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364 (1983) (per curium). 
Mr. Mourer's alibi testimony that appellant was on ,1 
job site at the time of the robbery does not necessitate sucl, 
a reasonable doubt. In State v. Linden, Utah, 6'i7 P.2d 1164 
(1983), defendant presented three alibi witness placing 
defendant in California at the time of the TJtah crime. Id. at 
1365-66. Still, the conviction was affirmed on appeal beca11s> 
the evidence viewecl in a light favorable to the vercl ict 
included three state witness who placecl defendant in Utah nclf 
the time of the crime. Id 
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In the instant case, the state presented two 
witness, Mr. Cosaert (T. 77) and Ms. Cornia (T. 106), who 
rkscribed the robber and subsequently identified appellant. A 
q1rl friend, Laureen Fite, related conversations with 
appellant about bank rob be ri es and plans to rob a bank ( T. 
40). A gun was found at appellant's residence that matched 
descriptions given at the bank hy ,Jule Terry (T. 16) and which 
the jury could compare with bank photos of the robber and his 
gun (T. 49-50, R. 96). Evidence was presented of a trip by 
appellant to Hawaii soon after the robbery date (T. 138, 150). 
A ski mask and stocking were also found in appellant's 
residence (T. 128). In contrast, Mr. Mourer's memory was 
corroborated only by a time card with a changed date (T. 178). 
Mr. Mourere had not testified at the preliminary hearing (T. 
180), and had an incentive to protect his job as a supervisor 
by exaggerating his constant supervision of appellant. 
Further, Mourer could not remember when he corrected 
appellant's time card (T. 178). Viewing the evidence in a 
light favorable to the verdict, Mr. Mourer's testimony was 
apparently not so credible to the jury that it must have 
raised a reasonable Cloubt in the minds of reasonable jurors. 
Nor was Mr. Mourer's testimony so credible as to make the 
state's evidence so comparatively inconclusive or inherently 
irnprubable as to raise a reasonable doubt. There was 
sufficeint evidence to support the conviction of appellant. 
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Appellant also contencls that thP iclentification hv 
Ms. Cosaert and Ms. Cornia were given under conclitions 
creating "a substantial likelihood of irrep<'lrahle 
identification." (Appellant's brief However, th0 
factors pointed out hy appellant iffe not so extreme as to 
exclude their testimony, but merely reflect on its credil,llit 
and were openly ann sufficiently brought to the jury's 
attention. 
The standard in assessing whether a police 
identification procedure denies the accused due process 
considers whether "uncler a totality of the circumstances, 
are so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparahle 
mistake of identification as to deny the accusea a fair 
trial." State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2n 353, 357 (l<J8n). 
Appellant offers no eviclence or argument that the photo arrav 
shown to Mr. Cosart was suggestive. Insteacl, appellant 
contends that the observations by Cosart and Cornia were so 
brief and limitea as to justify suppression of their 
testimony. 
On the contrary, the rape victim in Mccumber saw 
assailant's face only briefly in a aarkened room immeaiately 
after she had been awakenea from sleep. Id. Noting this 
limited observation, the court still aclmittea her testirnonv: 
Such factors, however, although they may 
weaken the probative impact of the 
evidence offered, ao not manaate 
suppression of the eviclence in the name of 
due process without some showing that the 
identification procedures were themselves 
impermissibly suggestive. 
-fl-
I cl. 
Both Mr. Cosaert and Ms. Cornia made their 
,-,J,sc,rvat ions at short distances, in full sunlight, with direct 
c1 t t0nt ion. Mr.Crosaet's identification was restricted to 
facial features observed through the opening of the robber's 
mask and the robber's height and weight. 'ls. Cornia's 
inentitication was specific in describing hair color, hair 
wave and facial profile. Her detailed recognition was 
partially aided by a recognition of appellant from a previous 
encounter. There was sufficiently detailed observation by the 
two eyewitnesses to warrant the presentation of their 
testimony. 
The length of their observations and whether either 
or both witnesses saw someone other than appellant goes to the 
probative value of their testimony and an ultimate issue of 
fact. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the verclict, the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support 
appellant's conviction. It was not so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertainecl a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt. 
supra at 444. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT"S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S SUGGESTED TELFAIRE INSTRUCTION 
WAS PROPER AND WITHING THE COURT'S SOUND 
DISCRETION. 
Appellant's suggestecl (T. 225) -jury instruction,,, 
the purported vagaries of eyewitness identification (R. 14il1 
paraphrases much of the jury ins tr uct ion recommend ea in lln i to,J 
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, 
the trial courts refusal to give appellant's instruction was 
within its discretion and not prejudicial to appellant. rrtah 
case law rejects the contention that a Telfaire-type 
instruction is mandatory in cases where eyewitness testimony 
may be determinative. Viewing the instruct ions as a whole, 
the jury was adequately instructed on the elements of the 
offense, the state's burc1en of proof, and the jury's role in 
assessing the credibility of witnesses. Given the available 
corroborative evidence, the weakness of appellant's alibi 
evidence, the conclitions of observation, the number of 
eyewitnesses ( 2) and the consistency of their ic1entifications, 
no Telfaire - type instruction was required. Even if there 
was error in failing to give the Telfaire instruction, anv 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the facts 
of the instant case. 
Utah has refused to adopt a rigid rule requirin0 a 
Telfair isntruction in all cases where eyewitness testimony 
may be dispositive of a defendant's alibi. State v. Schaffer, 
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Utah, 638 P.2d 1185 (1981). Jury instruciton should be 
considered as a whole. State v. Caffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777 
(1977); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 20 414 P.2d 575 
(1%6). Schaffer upheld the trial court's refusal to give a 
Telfaire instruction where the jury was adequately instructed 
that (1) the state must proveeach element of the offense beyon 
a reasonble doubt, ( 2) the jury is the exclusive judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses, and (3) the jury must find that 
the state has proved beyond a reasonalbe doubt each element of 
the charged offense. Schaffer at 1187. Utah's refusal to 
adopt a rigid rule mandating the Telfaire instruction in all 
cases follows the plurality portion among federal district.l 
See, State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982) (dicta at 61: 
"We have ot heretofore held that such an instruction is 
required. We believe the giving of it shoulc'l be left to the 
discretion of the trial court."). 
Jury instruction #3 adequatley explains the State's 
burc'len to prove essential allegations beyond a reasonable 
doubt ( R. 98). Further instructions define reasonable doubt 
See, e.g., Cullen v. United States, 408 F.2d 1178, 1181 
TSfh Cfr. 1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 129, 
131-132 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 449 u.s. 855, 101 s.ct. 
151, 66 L. Ed.2d 69 (1980)--rfD instruction within 
discretion of trial court and need be given only when there 
is a danger of misic'lentification due to lack of 
corroborative evidence.); United States v. Masterson, 529 
P.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Montelbano, 
F.2d 56, 59-60 (2nd Cir. 1979). But cf., United 
States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (""fr'd Cir. T97IT"; United 
States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968); Jones v. 
United States, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 83, 361 F.2d 537 (1966); 
United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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(Instruction #7, R. 101); stress the iury's role as the 
exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weiqr,' 
of the evidence (Instruction #8, R. 102); and emphasize the 
State's burden of proving each element of aggravated robbery 
beyond a reasonable doubt (Instruction #12, R. 106). 
Instruction #18 (R. 112) explicitly requires the State to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant 
as the perpetrator of the crime.2 Instruction# 19 (R. 1131 
raises defendant's alibi defense and relates it to the 
reasonable doubt standard.3 Instruction #20 (R. 114) states 
clearly that the defendant must present only enough evidence 
of his alibi to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt and 
defendant need not prove his alibi by a preponderance or 
greater evidence.4 
Appellant's requested Telfaire instruction (R. 140) 
would be redundant on the issues of burden of proof and jury 
responsibility for assessing the credibility of the witness's 
testimony.5 Appellant is not entitled to a jury instruction 
that is repetitive or redundant, or "if it appears that the 
giving of the requested instruction would not have affected 
the outcome of the trial." State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 
353, 359 (1980). 
2 See Appendix A of Respondent's Brief. 
3 See Appendix A of Respondent's Brief. 
4 Id. 
5 See Appendix B of Respondent's Brief. 
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During exaimination of the witnesses, there was 
attention focused on the proximity and length of 
observation, the lighting conditions, the certainity of the 
irlentifications, and the length of time between observation 
and identification. Purther, the State presented 
corroborative testimony of conversations between appellant and 
a girlfriend about robbing hanks (T. 43) and a photograph seen 
by the girlfriend depicting appellant with a stack of money 
(T. 44). The State also introduced an airline ticket to 
Hawaii in appellant's name as well as a ski mask, stocking and 
gun found at appellant's residence (T. 153) that the jury 
could compare with bank photos of the robber (T. 20-24). 
Contrary to the confusing evidence in State v. 
Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), there are no discrepancies 
in the instant case between the identification and earlier 
descriptions by eyewitnesses. This case involves two calm, 
objective witnesses whose observations occurred in daylight in 
contrast to the Malmrose identification by one sexuallly 
assaulted victim at night. Appellant makes no argument of 
suggestive photo arrays as did the Malmrose defendant. 
Further, appellant's weak alibi witness also contrasts with 
the substantial corroboration of the alibi in Malmrose. 
This case does not so delicately hinge on the 
vagaries of eyewitness identifiction that a Telfaire 
instruction must have been given to insure a fair trial. The 
purported hazards of eyewitness testimony are not acutely 
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present in these identifications. Ms. Cornia recognizecl 
appellant from a previous encounter. The observations by ,>ilcc. 
witness were in gooc1 light, at close c1istanceoc;, and form nnL 
part of a case that incluc1es substantial corroborative 
evidence. 
No benefit would have followed from instructin'J th• 
jury on the nuances of visual perceptions, or esoteric 
distinctions on types of memory. No Telfaire instruction wac 
needed. Even if appellant's instruction should have been 
given, any error in failing to give it would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable c1oubt in that giving the requestec1 
instruction would not have affected the verdict in light of 
the overwhelming evidence against appellant. State v. 
Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980); State v. Bell, Utah, 563 
P.2d 186 (1977). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Appellant hac1 a right to the effective assistance nf 
counsel under the United States and Utah Constitutions. l'.S. 
Const. art. VI anc1 XIV, Utah Const. art 1 <> 12. Appellant 
contenc1s that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 
because counsel failec1 to subpoena additional witnesses to 
testify (a) as to appellant's alibi, and (b) as to staternentc 
by the deceased Paul Watson admitting Watson's commission ut 
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the February 5 robbery. However, appellant fails to carry his 
burden of establishing the ineffectiveness of counsel. 
<ounsel's failure to call additional witnesses was within 
counsel's legitimate legal judgment of trial tactics or 
strategy. 
Appellant's right to the effective assistance of 
counsel entitles him to "the assistance of a competent member 
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with 
lhe interest of the accused and present such defenses as are 
available under the law and consistent with the ethcs of the 
profession." Codianna v. Mooris, Utah, 660 P.ed 1101 (1983) 
(quoting State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.ed 203, 204, (1976) ). 
Appellant has the burden of establishing inadequate 
representation by proof that is "a demonstrable reality and 
not a speculative matter." State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 
56, 58 (1982). Legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial 
tactics or strategy is not ineffective counsel even if the 
judgment appears unwise in retrospect. Codianna at 1109. 
Finally, "it must appear that any deficiency in the 
performance of counsel was prejudicial." Id. Error is 
prejudicial only if appellant shows a "reasonable likelihood 
that there would have been a different result" without 
counsel's error. State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (1979). 
Appellant's claim of error is speculative rather 
than a demonstrable reality. Counsel for appellant called 
appellant's boss, Bill Guy Mourer, to testify as to 
appellant's alibi that he was at work during the robbery. 
(T. 167). There is no evidence in the record that other 
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members of the work crew were locatable for subpoena, 
have corroborated Mourer's testimony, or would have been as 
credible as the boss. Similarly, there is no evidence in rt, 
record that addition al witnesses other than Randy Sargent 
heard confessions of the deceased Paul Watson, that the iuq 
would have believed such witnesses, or even that the jury 
would have been more inclined to believe Watson's statements 
than the evidence presented against appellant. 
Appellant's decision not to subpoena additional 
witnesses was within counsel's legitimate judgment of trial 
strategy even if such witnesses were available. The expense 
of additional subpoenas, the time needed to present their 
testimony, or counsel's assessment of their credibility may 
have effected counsel's strategy. Even if hindsight questions 
that strategy because the jury rejected appellant's alibi 
and/or failed to believe that Paul Watson committed the 
robbery, unwise choices of strategy do not constitute 
ineffective counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
( 1970). 
Finally, any deficiency in the performance of 
counsel ws not prejudicial in the sense of there being a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result without the error. 
The testimony of additional witnesses would still have 
weighed against the State's evidence of two eyewitnesses, 
statements by appellant to his girlfriend and her testimon\' 
regarding a photograph of money, a trip by appellant to Hawaii 
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shortly after the robbery, and physical evidence found at 
appellant's residence that the jury could compare with bank 
photos. There is no likelihood of a different result given 
thP strength of the State's case. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
convict appellant. Two witnesses at the bank identified 
appellant. There was also corroborative physical evidence 
introduced, as well as testimony concerning conversations 
between appellant and his girlfriend about bank robberies 
committed by appellant. Appellant's sole alibi witness was 
simply not as credible as the sufficient evidence against 
appellant. 
The trial court's refusal to give appellant's 
suggested instruction or eyewitness identification testimony 
was proper and within the court's sound discretion. The 
Telfaire instruction is not required under Utah case law and 
not needed in the instant case. 
Appellant was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel. Counsel's failure to call additional witnesses was 
within his proper judgment of trial strategy and tactics. Any 
supposed harm from such failure is purely speculative. 
This Court should affirm appellant's conviction of 
aqqravated robbery. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
lb 
,,r rhe defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The identity 
One of the questions raised in this case was the identification 
d t\ll' defendant is an element of the offense and the StElte 
h;is the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1his means that you, the jury, must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable 
i·'uh' , )f the accuracy of the identification of the defendant 
I"· f, ·" vou may find him guilty of any offense. If you are not 
, ,., ''need beyond a i:easonable doubt that the defend.ont 1Jas the 
r er 00n ·.>Jho committed the er ime then you must find the de 
INSTRUCTION NO. I q 
The defendant has raised the defense of alibi. 
The defendant in this case has introduced evidence tending 
to show that he was not present at the time and place of 
the commission of the alleged offense for which he is here 
rn trial. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, 
you ha"e a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present 
at the the crime was committed, he is entitled to an 
: 
INSTRUCTION NO. (;,/--
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not 
T'i' r_· a defendant to establish the defense of alibi by 
prce" 11r1crance or greater weight of evidence. The laws 
of u•.·all require the defendant to bring forward some 
e _ 1 cil'n 'e which tends to show that he was not present at the 
rime and place of the commission of the alleged offense. 
: f the di:fendant has done this, and if such evidence when 
r'nsidE Pd in connection with all other evidence in this 
osc raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt 
"Ou m.•,-l acquit him c·f the offense charged in the Information. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ____µ.____ 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief 
or impression by the witness. In this case its value depends 
the opportunity the witness had to observe whether 
not the defendant was the person who took personal property 
in the possession of Julie Terry on February 5, 1981, and 
to make a realiable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the fol lowing: 
Cl> Are you convinced that the witness had the 
capacity and an adequate opportunity to bserve the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity 
to obser the person at the time will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far 
or close the witness was from the offender how good were 
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion 
to see or know the person in the past. 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification 
made by that witness subsequent to the event was a product 
of his or her own recollection? You may take into account 
both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances 
under which the identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant 
presented to her for identification, you should scrutinize 
the identification with great care. You may also consider 
the length Of time that lapsed between the occurrence of 
the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to 
defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the 
identification. 
